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This article explores the effects that post-Soviet public sector reform has had on civic participation in 
the policy process in contemporary Russia. Drawing on 50 interviews with individuals and citizens’ 
groups involved in either public consultative bodies (PCBs) or socially oriented NGOs (SO NGOs), the 
article demonstrates that policy-making and delivery in contemporary Russia are characterised by a 
desire on the one hand to harness the knowledge and abilities of citizens and civic groups in place of 
state departments perceived to be bureaucratic and inefficient, and to control and curtail this 
participation on the other. We argue that these countervailing tendencies can be conceptualised as 





































Since the end of the Cold War, formerly state controlled economies across the post-Soviet 
space have become accessible to global markets. It is widely perceived that there is now ‘no 
alternative’ to the existing global financial order as the former communist countries have 
become embedded to different extents within global fiscal and governance networks 
(Fukuyama, 1989; Beck, 1999; Sakwa, 1999; Heathershaw and Cooley, 2016). Principles of 
public sector reform that seek to create markets in areas previously controlled by the state, such 
as utilities, education and public health, are endorsed by international organisations and 
attached as loan conditionalities by international financial institutions. Yet there is a great deal 
of regional, national and local variety in the forms these reforms take and the contentions that 
arise as they are implemented across the world. Global norms of public sector reform that 
include privatisation, decentralisation and the outsourcing of government functions interact 
with domestic legislation and constitutions, as well as political cultures and traditions, to 
produce hybrid versions and modifications of these norms (see Robertson, 1995; Swyngedouw, 
2004; Ong 2006).  
  
This essay explores the way in which the contemporary Russian government has implemented 
one key norm of public sector reform: increased involvement of non-state actors in public 
policy-making and delivery. We address two questions: first, we consider why the Russian 
government has created new avenues for public participation in policy processes and, second, 
we assess the extent to which these avenues introduce pluralism into policy-making and 
delivery. We argue that the Kremlin has created participatory mechanisms in order to develop 
a form of governance that allows the government to downsize what it perceives as its 
burgeoning Soviet-era bureaucracy while maintaining control of the public sphere. However, 
this has been only partially successful. As with all institutional reforms, unintended 
consequences have emerged from these changes to the rules of the game: the new participatory 
institutions allow non-state actors a certain amount of influence in the policy process and, in 
some cases, can shape the overall direction of reforms. 
 
Contemporary Russia constitutes a particularly interesting site in which to explore this norm, 
since the scholarly consensus is that Russia’s political system is a hybrid regime; that is, it 
possesses institutions that resemble the form of democratic pluralism but are ultimately 
subordinate to arbitrary state power (Shevtsova, 2001; Brown, 2001; Diamond, 2002; 
McMann, 2006; March, 2009; Colton and Hale, 2009; Petrov, Lipman and Hale, 2010; 
Robertson, 2010; Way, 2010; Treisman, 2011; Petrov, Lipman and Hale, 2014). This body of 
work demonstrates how Russia’s hybrid regime avoids the outright repression associated with 
authoritarianism tout court, but rather engages in forms of manipulation – of elections, the 
judicial system, opposition groups and parties, and the media. The case of Russia is important 
for understanding the implications of the advancement of public sector reform around the world 
as it exemplifies the way in which a non-liberal state can re-appropriate, or ‘manipulate’, 
internationally promoted principles for attempts at domestic regime consolidation. 
 
We have conducted 50 interviews with current and former members of two new types of 
institution created by the Kremlin that aim to increase the involvement of citizens and non-
profit organisations in policy-making and delivery. Regarding policy-making, public 
consultative bodies (obshchestvennye konsul’tativnye struktury, hereafter PCBs) allow certain 
citizens to advise local officials on draft laws; regarding policy delivery, ‘socially oriented’ 
NGOs are becoming increasingly active in public service  provision. In recent years, electoral 
reforms have eroded formal avenues of participation, such as elections, as these ‘apolitical’ 
participatory channels have widened. These channels must therefore be seen not only as a 
means for local authorities to harness citizens’ expertise in the development and provision of 
services, but also as an attempt to create new participatory mechanisms that do not challenge 
the prevailing political regime. 
 
How can we conceptualise this new participatory architecture of the Russian state? Neither 
liberal-democratic nor Marxist in orientation, we argue that instead this architecture most 
closely corresponds to what Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have termed ‘organic statism’ (see 
Linz, 2000; Stepan, 2001). According to this model, the state is interventionist and strong, 
individualism and elections are downplayed, and the state is seen as ‘playing a relatively 
autonomous, architectural role in the polity’ (Stepan, 2001: 62). However, organic statism also 
‘accords an important role for the decentralised political participation of semi-autonomous 
functional groups’ (ibid.: 68). Linz writes, ‘we find that a variety of social groups and 
institutions defined by the state are created and allowed to participate to one or another degree’ 
(Linz, 2000: 176). Organic statist regimes thus seek to create forums that allow social pluralism 
to exist, but also enable elites to manage and control this pluralism. Citizens can participate in 
some areas of public life, but not in those dominated by the elite, typically where major 
decision-making takes place. According to Linz, leaders may choose this arrangement due to a 
simultaneous rejection of both liberal-democratic and Marxist-inspired governmental 
frameworks, while also needing to provide formal avenues for interest representation (Linz, 
2000: 208). However, such structures can become just another element of the domestic political 
hierarchy as elites are rarely accountable to them. Despite this, they represent a limit to the 
‘monistic ambitions’ of the political elite who may otherwise attempt to install a more 
totalitarian system (Linz, 2000: 213).  
 
Linz and Stepan characterised the kind of participation enabled by these structures as limited 
pluralism. They argue that this is the most important factor in understanding the various types 
of authoritarian regime (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 38) since it allows one to assess ‘which 
institutions and groups are allowed to participate and in what way and which ones are excluded’ 
(Linz, 2000: 175). Linz and Stepan were writing in the second half of the 20th Century and 
initially elaborated their model for classic non-state actors, such as the church and the military 
(see Stepan, 1978). They could not have foreseen the ways in which state bureaucracies would 
fragment and diversify, or the kinds of non-state groups that would engage in governance 
towards the turn of the millennium. In our view, the concept of limited pluralism remains 
pertinent today because, although the non-state groups may differ from those elaborated in the 
original model, the state still provides avenues for some to participate and excludes others, the 
fundamental core of their model. 
 
Using the concept of limited pluralism to view Russia’s evolving relationship between the 
government and non-state groups, we argue, shifts the focus away from the long-standing 
Western focus on the extent to which a ‘civil society’ is developing in the post-Soviet context 
(Howard, 2003; Uhlin, 2006; Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010). Likewise, it distances 
itself from the normative and Eurocentric implications of theories of civil society more broadly 
(see, for example, Cohen and Arato, 1992; Seligman, 1992; Kaldor, 2003). Instead, it allows 
us to focus on the role of the state in Russia’s social sphere, and highlight the ways in which 
changes in state architecture beget new relationships between government and citizens. The 
goal of this article is therefore not to assess how far the organic statist model fits the overall 
social-political-economic nexus in post-Soviet Russia; rather, it is to propose a vocabulary that 
might help to conceptualise the changes taking place in Russia’s reforming public sector and 
the impact these changes have on civic participation.  
 
Civic Participation in the Policy Process: A Principle of New Public Management 
Since the 1980s, Western governments have been transforming state bureaucracies according 
to a cluster of principles that have come to be known as New Public Management (NPM) 
(Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010: 17). These principles include decentralisation of budget 
responsibility to local governments, privatisation of state assets and services, outsourcing, 
competition among state agencies for government funding, and the reconfiguration of the 
citizen as a ‘consumer’ of public services (Hood, 1995; Ferlie et al. 1996: 6-9; Peck, 2010: 9; 
Plant, 2010; Denters and Rose, 2005: 261; Geddes, 2005; Clarke et al., 2007; Flynn, 2007: 204; 
Massey and Pyper, 2005: 105).  In the West, NPM was utilised to steer the state bureaucracy 
away from the so-called progressive public administration (PPA) of the mid-20th Century, 
characterised by a statist, bureaucratic method of welfare delivery (and whose most extreme 
form was the Soviet welfare state) (Hood, 1995; Osbourne, 2010: 4).  Although NPM is 
considered a broadly global trend, it has been noted that different countries ‘have different 
starting points, are at different stages of reform and face different internal and external 
constraints’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007: 9). This means that the application of the 
principles of NPM in diverse political-cultural settings can produce new structural frameworks 
and new practices, as we will see below. 
  
The increased involvement by non-state actors in the policy process resulting from NPM 
implies a fundamental reconceptualisation of the relationship between citizens and government 
(Denters and Rose, 2005; Geddes, 2005; Pierre and Guy Peters, 2000: 4). This has two 
implications for the design of participatory institutions. Regarding policy-delivery, NPM 
assumes that government is neither best able nor best equipped to provide certain welfare 
services; instead, citizens’ groups are seen as more flexible, efficient and cognizant of 
beneficiaries’ needs. Consequently, government services are outsourced to third sector 
providers. Regarding policy-making, since the government is no longer the primary source of 
expertise in service delivery, the inclusion of citizens and non-state service providers in the 
policy-making process has become necessary in order to fill the inevitable knowledge gap. 
Pierre and Guy Peters have argued that, ‘if they are to be successful in governing, democracies 
will have to devise means of accommodating more continuous forms of participation, while 
still being able to supply the needed direction to society’ (Pierre and Guy Peters, 2000: 4; see 
also Swyngedouw, 2005; Vibert, 2007; Keane, 2009). As we discuss below, this prescription 
applies to non-democracies as well. 
 
In the case of Russia, some have argued that participation by non-state actors in Putin’s Russia 
constitutes little more than ‘window dressing’ for the regime (Markus, 2007); others claim that 
it is a result of low state capacity (Hedberg 2016). However, our research suggests that there 
exists a genuine desire on the part of the state to increase levels of citizens’ input. Indeed, there 
is a growing body of work that demonstrates the influence of NPM on public sector reform in 
general (Verheijen and Dobrolyubova, 2007; Cook, 2007, 2013; Wengle and Rasell, 2008; 
Romanov, 2008) and increased civic participation in the policy process in particular (Hemment 
2009; Tarasenko, 2015; Bindman, 2015; Myhre and Berg-Nordlie, 2016; Aasland, Berg-
Nordlie and Bogdanova, 2016; Bogdanova and Bindman, 2016). These studies also show, 
however, that this is not a simple transferral (or ‘diffusion’) to Russia of ‘global’ (or Western) 
norms and standards (on diffusion, see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 
1999); rather, as elsewhere, Russian lawmakers reshape these norms to suit the context of its 
hybrid authoritarian regime. 
 
Civic participation in non-democracies remains under-researched, since studies of 
authoritarianism tend to focus on power structures at the national and elite levels, (Brownlee, 
2007; Schlumberger, 2007; Brooker, 2009; Svolik, 2009; Gandhi, 2010; Pepinski, 2015). 
However, civic participation, as opposed to ‘mobilization’ (see Yurchak, 2006), is present in 
many non-democratic states, in some cases, existing alongside mobilizational activities. Forms 
of participation prevailed in the post-Stalinist USSR, such as interest groups (Skilling and 
Griffiths, 1973), local soviets (Friedgut, 1979; Hahn, 1988), and monitory bodies (Adams, 
1978; Owen, 2016), which were framed as part of the ‘withering away of the state’ under 
communism.  In contemporary China, scholars have highlighted the incremental policy change 
effected by domestic NGOs, media and individual activists who still work within the 
framework of the party-state (Mertha, 2009; Zhu, 2008; Jiang, 2010; He and Warren, 2011; 
Duckett and Wang, 2013). Likewise, Jayasuriya and Rodan’s 2007 study of Southeast Asian 
political regimes focuses on varying ‘modes of participation’, defined as ‘the institutional 
structures and ideologies that shape the inclusion and exclusion of individuals and groups in 
the political process’ that a particular regime enables. They state, ‘rather than dismissing some 
modes of participation as mere artefacts of dysfunctional democratic institutions, we seek 
instead to explain the underlying political dynamics behind such participation’ (Jayasuriya and 
Rodan, 2007). In line with this, we propose the use of ‘limited pluralism’ as a framework for 
comparative studies of participation in non-democracies as it enables comparisons both of the 
kinds of actors that are included or excluded and the institutional frameworks developed by 
states to control participation. 
 
Taking steps towards this endeavour, we argue that the post-Soviet administrative reforms 
discussed below can be considered an articulation of the international trend towards NPM 
within the context of a hybrid authoritarian regime, which has created institutions aimed to 
encourage participation by regime-friendly civic actors, and exclude critics. However, the 
state’s limited control means that, in some cases, these actors exercise rather more influence in 
the policy process than intended. In order to demonstrate this, we draw on 50 interviews with 
members of PCBs and socially oriented NGOs in Moscow, St Petersburg, Samara, Perm and 
Nizhniy Novgorod between 2012 and 2016. Before we present our findings, we provide some 
background to the norm of civic participation as it has emerged in post-Soviet Russia. 
 
The Development of Civic Participation in Post-Soviet Russia 
Increased civic participation in the policy process has been a key theme in Russian government 
discourse, which is explicitly linked to ‘unstoppable’ forces of globalisation. As Owen has 
demonstrated elsewhere (2016), Putin has frequently called upon citizens to shed their passive 
Soviet-era mentality since ‘welfare hand-outs without taking responsibility for one’s actions 
are simply no longer possible in the 21st century’ (Putin 2012a). In contrast to the Soviet period, 
when citizens ‘still expected the state to take care of them’ (Putin 2012b), the post-Soviet era 
is portrayed as a ruthless international competition for economic advantage, which requires 
domestic governments to adopt policies of austerity (Putin 2012a). In order that the domestic 
bureaucracy adapt to the new global environment, the Kremlin has called both for greater civic 
involvement in policy-making via PCBs, online deliberative fora, and public hearings on local 
government effectiveness (Putin 2012b), and for greater NGO involvement in policy delivery, 
arguing that civic groups ‘often know the situation on the ground better than the authorities and 
have unique experience in helping people in difficult situations’ (Medvedev 2010). 
Accordingly, new institutional fora that enhance forms of civic participation have proliferated. 
 
The first and largest consultative body is the Federal Public Chamber (Obshchestvennaya 
Palata), created in 2005 to facilitate co-operation between citizens and the authorities, 
represent citizens’ interests, protect the rights of citizens and NGOs and monitor government 
activities (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2005). With a quarter of members directly selected by the 
President, this format has been replicated at regional and municipal levels. Public chambers 
across the Federation play an important part in social life, mediating between conflicting 
groups, acting as platforms for discussions on social issues and coordinating local NGOs 
(Evans, 2008; Richter, 2009a; Richter, 2009b; Belokurova 2010; Sakwa, 2011; Stuvøy, 2014; 
Olisova, 2015).  
 
Legislation governing the Public Chamber also permitted the creation of public councils, 
(obshchestvennye sovety) – groups of well-regarded citizens who give opinions on the activities 
of government ministries. After several years of undefined legal status, the Presidential decree 
of May 2011 gave them legally enshrined rights. According to this decree, a public council is 
an 'advisory body (soveshchatel'nyi organ) whose resolutions are non-binding 
(rekomendatel'nyye)' (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2011). Public councils, while not possessing 
executive authority, were given broad legal mandate to observe the work of government 
ministries in full. However, the decree still stated that the council's final membership was to be 
approved by the ministry, with the federal-level council co-ordinating regional appointments. 
Overall, this decree established 102 public councils (Obshchestvennaya Palata RF, 2011: 82), 
and prompted the proliferation of public councils in the federal and regional offices of virtually 
all government agencies, departments and services.  
 
Most recently, Federal Law No. 212-FZ ‘On the origins of public oversight in the Russian 
Federation’ was signed on 21 July 2014 (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2014). This law continues the 
trend towards increasing the number of consultative bodies attached to government agencies at 
the federal, regional and municipal levels by stating that civic participation should be enacted 
through PCBs (Dmitrieva and Strenin, 2014: 63; Owen, forthcoming). The corporate-
consultative PCB network is therefore likely to expand in the future.  
 
Concomitantly, opportunities for civic participation at the policy delivery stage have expanded 
through the increasing inclusion of ‘socially oriented NGOs’ (hereafter SONGOs). A federal-
level funding scheme of presidential grants for civic groups working on social projects was 
established in 2006 and, in 2010, amendments to the Law on NGOs formalised the category of 
‘SONGOs’. According to this law, SONGOs are non-profit organisations whose activities aim 
to solve social problems concerning conservation, historical preservation, sports, education and 
healthcare, and are entitled to receive support from regional authorities, ranging from tax 
exemption and training to direct financial sponsorship (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2010). This 
category distinguishes them both from organisations perceived to have a critical or anti-
government agenda, such as the election-monitoring organisation, GOLOS, and the 
longstanding human rights organisation, Memorial, and from national branches of international 
NGOs, such as Amnesty Russia, Human Rights Watch or Greenpeace.  
 
In 2011, a state register of SONGOs was established, which are offered various funding 
schemes by the government: federal-level grants to support SONGOs; subsidies to cover utility 
payments made by SONGOs; and targeted funding for SONGOs from the regional and 
municipal authorities (Tarasenko, 2013). In 2013, SONGOs were awarded $75 million in order 
to implement ‘socially beneficial’ projects (RIA Novosti, 2013). In addition, under new 
legislation passed in 2013 and 2015, all levels of government must use small and medium 
enterprises and SONGOs to provide 15% of the total annual value of their contracts for social 
service provision (Benevolenski, 2014). 
 
Meanwhile, reforms expanding opportunities for civic participation have been accompanied by 
increasing restrictions on elections at federal, regional and municipal levels. At the federal 
level, out-going President Medvedev stated in 2011 that he and Putin had agreed ‘a long time 
ago’ that he would step aside for Putin to return to the Presidency (Englund and Lally, 2011), 
seemingly confirming the electorate’s inability to alter the political fate of the country. The 
Parliamentary and Presidential elections that followed in 2011-2012 were widely seen to be the 
most fraudulent since the collapse of the USSR (Ryzhkov, 2011; Gel’man, 2015).  
 
At the regional level, direct gubernatorial elections were abolished in 2004 on national security 
grounds and replaced by a system of Presidential appointment.  They were re-instated briefly 
by President Medvedev in response to the unrest of 2011-2012, but in 2013 regional 
parliaments were given the option of cancelling elections, removing elected governors and 
submitting a list of three potential candidates for the post to the President, asking him to choose 
for them. In 2013, seventy-seven out of eighty-three regional governors were members of the 
ruling party, United Russia (Earle, 2013).  
 
At the municipal level, in 2009, the post of ‘city manager’ was introduced, replacing the elected 
mayor in some cities and working alongside the mayor in others in order ‘depoliticise city 
governments and to improve the delivery of municipal services to citizens’ (Moses, 2010). The 
role of manager undercut the authority of the elected mayor and strengthened the link between 
the Kremlin and the municipal government; governors and their managers were to become 
more attuned to the politics of the centre than the region (Gel’man and Ryzhenkov, 2011). 
 
Overall, the possibilities for citizens to engage in electoral politics have declined as the 
mechanisms for non-electoral participation have expanded. As certain state functions are 
privatised, outsourced and decentralised, citizens and NGOs are required to play a greater role 
in public administration and, as elections become less effective as a means to gauge public 
opinion, consultative bodies involving civil society representatives can act as an important 
‘feedback’ mechanisms that transmit citizens’ concerns to government (Evans, 2010). 
Contemporary participatory mechanisms must therefore respond to the demands both of the 
changing public sector and Russia’s hybrid regime: they must allow a certain extent of 
participation, but not enough to destabilize structures of power. 
  
Limited Pluralism in Policy-Making: Public Consultative Bodies 
Local governments have been actively rearticulating central government discourse in the 
recruitment of citizens into PCBs, presenting them as ways for patriotic citizens to alleviate 
social problems by assisting the authorities (Kommersant Vlast’, 2013; Argumenty i Fakty, 
2013; Pravitel’stvo Samarskoi Oblasti, 2013). However, the enormous variety both in the level 
of commitment from PCB members and in the engagement from local authorities means that 
there is no consistency in their level of influence in policy-making across the Federation. PCBs 
range from active centres of public debates, such as the federal and regional public chambers 
(Belokurova, 2010; Stuvøy, 2014; Olisova, 2015) to organisations recognised even by the 
Federal Public Chamber as being ‘insufficiently effective’ (Obshchestvennaya Palata, 2015: 
168). Based on 30 interviews conducted by Owen with current and former members of PCBs 
in Moscow, St Petersburg and Samara in 2012, this section considers first the ways in which 
the government constrains the activities of PCBs before giving an example of successful policy 
change. 
 
Local authorities control the activities of PCBs in two main ways: through the selection process 
and through selectively engaging on issues raised by PCBs. First, individuals seen to challenge 
local power structures too directly are often ejected from their PCB or denied re-selection after 
their term has expired. These ‘independent’ activists are frequently replaced with former 
government officials or with celebrities with no relevant experience.i  Others recalled how the 
authorities ignored their suggestions for new members, choosing instead people seen as 
conservative and apolitical.ii Several respondents stated that if the selection process were 
reformed to reduce government influence over membership, PCBs would be able to function 
better as platforms for dialogue.iii 
 
Secondly, PCBs facilitate leverage in some areas but not in others. Issues of national 
importance, such as Pussy Riot, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Sergei Magnitsky and the law on 
Foreign Agents were cited as areas where the government has refused to change position, 
despite significant lobbying via PCBs.iv One respondent stated that genuine policy debate was 
only possible on areas that do not touch Putin’s power vertical.v Another stated that if state 
departments were already areas of on-going reforms, PCBs would be more likely to influence 
outcomes.vi A third, who had been part of the development of the public council legislation, 
stated that the problem lay in their institutional dependence on the government institution they 
are supposed to monitor. In his view, in order to influence policy outcomes, public councils 
should be ‘real, serious structures, as independent as possible from the government departments 
to which they belong.’vii 
  
Despite these limitations, virtually all PCB members were able to mention an occasion when 
they had successfully influenced policy outcomes. Examples of successful lobbying included 
the introduction of courts of appeal, improvements in prison conditions, changing the law on 
military service to exempt PhD students from conscription, conservation of city architecture, 
monitoring of the local government budget and work on the liberalisation of the NGO law in 
2009.  
 
One example of a relatively influential public council is the Public Council under the Moscow 
Prosecutor’s Office, created in 2008 in order to ‘monitor violations of rights and freedoms of 
citizens; consider questions about improving collaboration between the Prosecutor’s Office and 
the public… and attract the public to collaboration with the Office’ (Memorial, 2009). One 
member, a prominent lawyer, explained the extent of the council’s influence: 
 
‘We in Moscow created a Public Council of the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office. That’s where 
I go – I even head it… But I have to say that it is much less effective than we hoped when 
we founded it. But there are some questions that we cannot resolve without dealing with 
the Prosecutor. We alone cannot deal with them – we have no leverage. We do manage to 
resolve some issues, but again, we were hoping for more effective co-operation. But its 
creation and existence is needed in my opinion. There is a possibility of dialogue.’ 
 
Another member, representing a well-known Moscow human rights organisation in this 
council, detailed the struggle to try to convince the Office to close bogus homeowners 
associations (tovarishchestvo sobstvennikov zhil’ya), which were extracting large sums of 
money from residents for fake repairs, among other things (Maksimov, 2013). According to 
him, 
 
‘We found a common language. Based on our letters, they began to close homeowners 
associations. They supported us, and said: “Yes, that's right. If they have been founded 
wrongly, they should be closed.” Our NGO showed these organisations were fake... but 
the authorities, again, did not completely follow it up. They should have initiated criminal 
proceedings, which they did not do. But still, in general, they unconditionally supported 
us in the courts, and as a whole, it was a successful campaign...’ 
 In 2012, two thousand bogus homeowners’ associations were closed in Moscow (Newsru.com, 
2012). 
 
According to the Federal Public Chamber, these types of organisation enable ‘a means of 
democratic participation in which party-political conflict as such is absent’ (Obshchestvennaya 
Palata, 2011: 5). Nonetheless, some (though by no means all) PCBs have a certain, though 
limited, influence on decision-making and political outcomes (Chebankova, 2013: 114-115; 
Stuvøy 2014; Olisova, 2015; Owen, 2015; Aasland, Berg-Nordlie and Bogdanova, 2016). It is 
clear that the PCB network is intended to provide vital policy input to a regime that seeks to 
avoid outright political competition. 
  
Limited Pluralism in Policy Delivery: Socially Oriented NGOs 
In the case of SONGOs, the NPM-style reforms implemented since 2010 have undoubtedly 
affected their independence. Many of the 20 SONGOs interviewed by Bindman in Moscow, St 
Petersburg, Perm and Nizhniy Novgorod in 2015 and 2016 highlighted the numerous 
constraints faced by this type of organisation in trying to continue and develop their activities, 
in particular the ‘Foreign Agent’ Law, which has discouraged many from applying for funding 
from abroad. Russia’s ongoing financial crisis has also led to major cutbacks in the number of 
individual charitable donations and is likely to lead to significant shortfalls in funding available 
from local authorities.viii Even when an organisation is successful in obtaining local 
government funding, this tends to be available for only a year at a time before another funding 
application has to be made, making it difficult for organisations to plan ahead, and making 
them much more reliant on other funding sources, such as individual and corporate donations 
and social enterprise (Bogdanova and Bindman, 2016; Krasnopolskaya et al., 2015). At present, 
only 16% of all Russian NGOs receive municipal or regional government funding, and only 
10% receive any federal financial support (Krasnopolskaya et al., 2015). As a result, they have 
welcomed the recent legislative changes theoretically enabling SONGOs to join a formal 
register of organisations through which they can compete for government tenders to become 
direct providers of social services. Several organisations stated that alternative providers could 
indeed improve the standard of social services and supported the creation of a market in which 
state, non-profit and for-profit organisations could compete: 
 
We need some kind of competitive market [for social service delivery]. When there’s 
competition you see development and when there isn’t, everything stagnates and ends up 
being bad for everyone. Commercial and non-commercial organisations are a real help to 
the government.ix 
 
The main advantage of this reform would be the creation of competition because, at the 
moment, the state social service sector is very under-developed, the heads of state 
providers don’t have to sit and think about how to attract clients because there’s no 
alternative to them so they have become lazy and don’t try to change or develop anything. 
So competition would be the main way to make them do this.x 
 
It appears that some SONGOs endorse the NPM-style approaches to welfare governance put 
forward by the Ministry of Economic Development. In many respects, this is hardly surprising 
given the constrained political and financial framework within which Russian NGOs must 
operate at present. Furthermore, the welfare reforms offer the prospect of both greater financial 
stability to SONGOs joining the official register and the chance to have a greater impact on 
policy development and delivery.  
 However, many of the NGOs interviewed as part of this study expressed great scepticism as to 
how these reforms would be implemented:  
 
Everything here operates top-down – and the regional authorities are forced to cooperate 
with charitable organisations in some way, even if they don’t want to…The government 
doesn’t want to change the system so these measures are just a formality, they are there 
because they are perceived as the right thing to do and that’s how they do it in the West.xi 
 
On the one hand, there is this open competition [for resources] and on the other there are 
many obstacles which stop us applying. Hardly any of the organisations we know and 
work with have joined the official register of SONGOs.xii 
  
What often happens is that a programme is formally set out but in reality, the mechanisms 
for implementing it do not exist.xiii 
 
This perception that everything happens ‘top-down’ in the social policy sphere and that the 
reforms are simply for show indicates that there is a significant gap in understanding and 
expectation between the high-level proponents of the reforms, who seek to increase innovation 
and alternative provision in the social service sector, and the potential providers of these 
services. This calls into question how the reforms might be implemented if the very 
organisations they seek to target are less than enthusiastic about participating. 
 
Furthermore, several SONGOs resisted the idea of becoming formal providers of social 
services, preferring to maintain a cordial but detached relationship with policymakers. They 
criticised the neoliberal nature of the reforms which, some pointed out, were an attempt by the 
state to divest itself of social responsibilities, exert greater control over NGOs operating in this 
area, and try to force non-state providers into a role they were not ready for. 
 
It’s obvious that any transfer of functions and funding from the state to NGOs will at least 
to some extent enable greater state control over those organisations which start to offer 
social services as part of a government tender. And in Russia you cannot assume that a 
charity will be able to assume responsibility for a significant proportion of service 
provision because the sector is not very developed.xiv 
 
There are certain major services which the state should offer, and there are some small-
scale services which could potentially be handed over to NGOs. But there’s a risk that the 
services offered by commercial and non-commercial organisations will not be effective. 
Organisations which want to make easy money but are unable to provide quality services 
might apply for these tenders. And as a result these services will either be of low quality 
or will not be offered at all.xv 
 
Overall, there are a number of implications for the potential success of increasing civic 
participation in policy delivery. While many SONGOs theoretically welcome the possibility of 
closer cooperation with the authorities, and the increased access to funding that this could 
bring, few expect the current reforms to be implemented successfully or for them to have any 
fundamental impact on their day-to-day activities. This indicates that, while the federal ‘centre’ 
may in theory be committed to imposing modes of welfare governance inspired by the global 
shift towards NPM, even in a semi-authoritarian system such as Russia, the non-state actors 
that are targets of these measures retain some capacity to side-step or even resist such reforms. 
They also appear to be relatively confident in their ability to continue to do this, without in any 
sense positioning themselves as in some way opposing or threatening the overall structure of 
the system. Therefore, in the short-term at least, the reforms are unlikely to do much to change 
the existing status quo. The analysis suggests that non-governmental actors have a limited 
capacity to influence the overall structure of governance, engaging with it when it is perceived 
to be beneficial, but also exercising the choice to opt out. Although the category of ‘socially 
oriented’ NGOs was created to make a political distinction between types of NGO, even these 
supposedly ‘apolitical’ organisations have the capacity to influence the direction and impact of 
the federal reforms (see also Kulmala, 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
The near-globally accepted public sector reform package comprising policies of privatisation 
of state assets, outsourcing of state functions to NGOs, charities and businesses, and the 
decentralisation of powers to local government have reduced the state’s ability to create and 
deliver effective public policy. This has increased the need for states to create mechanisms that 
boost the involvement of non-state actors in the policy process, including in non-democratic 
regimes such as Russia. Public consultative bodies and socially oriented NGOs have been 
created for this purpose.  
 
The consolidation of PCBs into an extensive network that advises and monitors official activity 
at all levels of government demonstrates a recognition by the Kremlin that increased levels of 
citizen feedback are vital for effective policy development. Yet although, PCBs allow some 
citizens a place at the policy-making table, this place is provided solely on the government’s 
terms and can be withdrawn at any time. Likewise, the evolution of SONGOs indicates that the 
Kremlin has adopted the idea that NGOs are more cost-effective, innovative and responsive to 
clients’ needs. Yet, although many SONGOs appear to be taking cautious advantage of 
opportunities for greater role in policy delivery, the state has tried to strengthen its control over 
non-state organisations acting in this sphere.  
 
We now return to the questions we posed at the beginning of this essay: why has the Russian 
government created new avenues for public participation in policy processes and what effect 
have they had on policy-making and delivery? To answer the first question, the new 
institutional framework for involving civic actors in policy processes is characterised by a 
desire on the one hand to harness the knowledge and abilities of citizens and civic groups in 
place of state departments perceived to be bureaucratic and inefficient, and to control and 
curtail this participation on the other.  
 
We argue that these countervailing tendencies can be conceptualised as limited pluralism. 
Overall, Linz’s exposition of limited pluralism channelled through corporatist structures in 
authoritarian regimes corresponds to the kind of civic participation emerging in contemporary 
Russia. The PCB network represents the creation of participatory institutions that run parallel 
to electoral modes of political representation, which themselves are often manipulated to serve 
the interests of elites. The category of SONGOs is designed to allow the government to 
distinguish between organisations considered useful and those considered inconvenient, and to 
devolve certain responsibilities in the social sector to those useful ones. Furthermore, the 
expansion of limited pluralism in Russia suggests that the Putin regime is developing a state 
infrastructure that does not merely replicate that of Western liberal-democratic states, but 
selectively deploys some of the key principles for domestic regime consolidation. Indeed, it 
indicates that ostensibly ‘democratic’ norms such as citizen involvement in the policy process 
can be used by non-democratic states to channel participation into narrow, apolitical forums. 
Second, the application of the concept of limited pluralism raises the question of the extent to 
which other non-democratic states incorporate alternative voices into the policy process, and 
the means by which they do so. Understanding the mechanisms for managing civic 
participation in non-democratic states adopting principles of New Public Management allows 
us to begin to explain how such regimes maintain stability while conducting disruptive public 
sector reform. 
 
Although PCBs and SONGOs are intended as a means for local authorities to co-ordinate a 
select number of non-state voices in the policy process, the fact that a level of pluralism exists 
within the system means that this process does not always happen as smoothly as the authorities 
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